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NOTES
TESTAMENTARY REVIVAL
Whether a will may be revived without the execution of a
codicil or another will after it has been revoked (a) by a subse-
quent inconsistent will or (b) by a subsequent will containing a
revocatory clause, has been an interesting problem in this coun-
try. The present discussion deals with the problem of revival
where there is no subsequent codicil, and the only reason for in-
ferring a revival arises from the fact that the formerly revoked
will still exists.1
Three positions have prevailed in England and they are not
difficult to state. Under the lead of Lord Mansfield 2 the rule
was thoroughly established that the revocation of a later revok-
ing will automatically revived the former will if it was still in
existence. The logic of this position is almost unassailable when
one considers the provisions of the Statute of Frauds regarding
revocation. This position however, led to many hardships be-
cause the restoration of a will to efficacy, which had been thought
to be entirely out of the way, and had ceased to express the tes-
tamentary desires of the testator, was not affected by the ques-
tion whether or not the testator intended a revival.
The earlier view of the Ecclesiastical Courts seems to have
been that presumably the will is revoked.3  Later, effect was
sought to be given to the intent and there was no presumption
either way.4 In this event the burden of proof would naturally
be upon the one asserting that the former will was intended to
1 The present writer has endeavored to show in an article In 40
Harvard Law Review 71 (1926), entitled "Testamentary Republication,"
that "Republication" properly speaking, applies to the execution of a
codicil which brings down to the date of the codicil the language of a
prior will, whereas "Revival" by codicil gives new life to an old but no
longer operative will, though at one time it must have been operative.
Republication and revival both differ from :'Incorporation by Refer-
ence" in which the Incorporating instrument gives testamentary life
for the first time to the writing incorporated. In that article revival by
subsequent writing was examined and so is not considered here.
It should be noted that the term "Revival" is to some degree a
misnomer in that it implies that a will is revoked immediately upon
the execution of a second revoking will. Whether this is true or not is
the question. Perhaps the term "restoration" would be preferable.
I Goodright D. Glazier v. Glazier (1770), 4 Burr. 2512; Harwooa v.
Goaaright (1774), 1 Cowp. 873 Helyar v. Helyar (1754), 1 Lee Bce. 116.
'Wilson v. Wilson (1821), 3 Phill. Eec. 543; Usticke v. Bawd e
(1824), 2 Add. Eec. 116.
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be revived. This view seems to be open to grave objections in
that the question whether a given instrument is revived becomes
dependent upon various bits of evidence, the force of which nay
impress different judges variously, and there would be little to
guide one in predicting how courts would hold in given circum-
stances.5 It also tends to reintroduce difficulties which the
Statute of Frauds sought to avoid.. In Pickens v. Davis( the
court was inclined to believe that oral evidence as to declaration
of the testator would be admissible. The court also raised the
question as to whether, when a testator had abandoned the dis-
positions in a prior will, by executing a later one, and then re
yokes a later one, he returns to the prior scheme. It is conceivea
that the really pertinent question is, has the prior will ever been
finally and effectually revoked. This, of course, throws us back
upon the common law position.
7
In America not a few jurisdictions follow the ecclesias-
tical position despite its difficulties. An extraordinary view was
once adopted in Connecticut,8 the suggestion probably coming
from Mr. Powell in England. It is something like a comming-
ling of the common law and the ecclesiastical views, to the effect
that if a will is revoked by a later will which is merely inconsist-
ent with it, it is revived on the revocation of the later will. If,
however, the prior will is revoked by a later will containing an
express revocatory clause, the revocation of such later will does
not restore the prior will. To distinguish between eases where
the later will is merely inconsistent with the former one, and
cases where the later will contains an express revocatory clause,
is to hold that this clause becomes operative at once though the
remainder of the instrument becomes operative only at death.
An effort to explain this anomaly is occasionally made by the sug-
gestion that where a statute permits of revocation either by subse-
quent will or by subsequent writing (properly executed) this
clause may be regarded as that subsequent writing.9 This rea-
5 See note in 7 Minn. Law Rev. (1922-1923) 158, dealing with the
elements considered in determining the testator's intention.
(1883) 134 Mass. 252.
TSee Rood-on Wills (Second Edition 1926) Sec. 361, note 65, for
a list of states which purport to follow the ecclesiastical view.
5James v. Marvin (1819), 3 Conn. 576.
'See Stetson v. Stetson (1903), 200 Ill. 601. This view seems to be
approved in a comment in 32 Yale Law Journal 70. The distinction
seems also approved in 7 Minn. L. Rev. (1922-3), 158, 162.
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soning seems to be far-fetched. An instrument may at various
stages of its execution be denominated a will. It is a will in
every sense on the death of the testator if it has been properly
executed but it is also usually referred to as a will after it is
signed and subscribed even though it may later be replaced. It
may also be referred to as a will after it is signed and before it
is subscribed, and it is often called a will even before it is signed.
It may -be important to know in what sense the term is used by
the legislature. But when the legislature declared that a will
may be revoked by a later will or other writing, it is almost cer-
tain to a denonstration that it did not intend that the "other
writing" should be found in and be a part of a later will. It
did not intend to distinguish between the various parts of a will
and denomninate part of it "another writing," since the juxta-
position of the words used precludes that interpretation. In
Connecticut when this view was first enunciated the statute did
not so provide.10 In Wlitehall v. Halbing" this view was finally
repudiated at its adopted home. Both in Connecticut and in
Florida recently the common law rule has probably been applied.
One cannot, however, always determine the true position of the
court when it is not required to choose between ecclesiastical and
the common law views.12  In Minnesota also the ecclesiastical or
common law rule has recently been adopted but it is not clear
which one.'3
Some jurisdictions have adopted a statute substantially like
the Wills Act.14  Under such a statute there can be no revival
without a re-execution or a republication of the will. Several
states have enacted a statute similar to that in New York which
reads as follows:
"If after the making of any will the testator shall make and exe-
cute a second will, the destruction, canceling, or revocation of such
second will shall not revive the first will, unless it appear by the terms
of such revocation that it was the intention to revive and give effect to
his first will or unless . . .1
'0 See 32 Yale Law Jour. (1922) 70.
U (1922) 98 Conn. 21, 118 AtI. 454.
"Schaefer v. Voyle (1924), 88 Fla. 170, 102 So. 7.
21n re Tibbetts' Estate (1922), 153 Minn. 53, 189 N. W. 401; Com-
mented upon in 7 Minnesota Law Review, supra, note 5.
11 See Carroll's Kentucky Statutes (6th Ed. 1922), Sec. 4834.
"See Rood on Wills, Sec. 361, Note 70, for states which have stat-
utes like the Wills Act. He also gives a list in Note 72 of the states
which have statutes similar to the New York statute. In 8 Cornell
Law Quart. (1923) 183, it is Indicated that some states reach the re-
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While the language is not entirely free from ambiguity, we
are doubtless to understand that if the revocation were by de-
struction merely, it would not be possible to comply with the
terms of the revocation and show that it was intended that the
prior will should be revived. It has been held in New York that
this revocation by later will must be in writing which is executed
as a will is required to be executed. Therefore this type of stat-
ute is not far different from the Wills Act in its general effect.
It is not probable that there Will be judicial peace with ref-
erence to the subject of "revival" until after a thorough study
of the problems both in England and here, comprehensive leg-
islation is enacted to define the policy for each jurisdiction. 16
The Kentucky Statute is to be commended.
ALvnx E. EvAs.
suit of the English statute without an act of the legislature but the
states are not named nor are cases cited. Other comments on various
phases of the matter may be found in 21 Mich. L. Rev. 142 (1903); 9
Harvard Law Rev. 364 (1899); 13 Harv. Law Rev. 142 (1903). See
also (1900) 39 American Law Register N. S. 505.
2 It is thought that a table showing the positions which have been
taken may be useful:
L Revival in the English Courts:
1. The Common Law Rule: The destruction of the revoking in-
strument revives automaticially the former, still existing will.
2. The Ecclesiastical Rule: No presumption either way, the
question of revival of the former will after the revocation of
the revoking will, is a matter of the intention of the testator.
3. The Statutory Rule: The Wills Act required a will once re-
yoked, to be re-executed or republished in order to be revived.
II. Revival in the American Jurisdictions:
1. The ecclesiastical rule prevails in several jurisdictions where
the revoking will is merely inconsistent. Cf. 1 Page on Wills
(2nd Ed. 1926), Sec. 442-448.
2. The common law rule obtains in several jurisdictions but in
several jurisdictions if (1) there is a statute authorizing re-
vocations by other duly executed will or other writing, and (2)
the later will contains an express -revocatory clause, the prior
will is not revived save by republication or re-execution.
3. The Statutory Rules:
1. In a few jurisdictions there is a statute similar to the
Wills Act dealing with the subject of revival. Cf. Carrol's
Kentucky Statutes (6th Ed. 1922), Sec. 4834.
If. In several states there is a statute requiring for revival
that the revocation of the later will show expressly that a
revival of the prior will is intended, or else re-execution or
republication only can revive the revoked will.
